Thinking and acting are consistently associated. Thinking precedes action at the stage where an intention for action is generated and thinking follows action for example to evaluate and justify its result. Thinking and acting have commonly been assumed to operate in strictly different domains: thinking draws on abstract conceptual representations, whereas motor control functions are thought to rely on relatively low-level and automatic processes. In recent years, however, research on motor control, action perception and action understanding revealed multiple interdependencies between acting and thinking, challenging the view that thinking and acting are controlled and constituted by different mechanisms. ‘Grounded cognition’ (Barsalou 2008) is the covering term for this new research perspective according to which the building blocks of thoughts are not based on modality-independent symbols, but are rather grounded in modal systems for perception and action.

ThinkAct aims to systematically investigate the role of thinking in and for motor control and, in turn, the role of motor parameters for the understanding of and thinking about actions (action concepts). The central hypothesis is – in line with the notion of ‘grounded cognition’ - that the very basis of action cognition is acquired and constituted by motor control. However, in later stages of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, action cognition becomes systematically independent from motor control.

Specifically, ThinkAct shall identify factors that may be constitutive for both motor control and action concepts and moreover, it seeks to prove whether there is a hierarchical or reciprocal connection between the different domains of motor control, action perception and action concepts which furthermore, may or may not be influenced by specific constitutive factors.

ThinkAct’s central aim is to develop an account of grounded action cognition through reciprocal, interdisciplinary interactions between philosophy, psychology and neurology.